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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 Richard Himelwright was indicted on September 7, 1993, 
and charged with two counts of Interstate Threats and 
Extortionate Demands, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(b),1 
(Counts I and II), and one count of Interstate Threats, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c),2 (Count III).  Prior to trial, 
Himelwright filed a motion in limine seeking to bar testimony 
regarding his purchase and possession of two firearms, claiming 
that their admission would violate Rule 404(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and would be unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.  
By Memorandum Opinion dated November 12, 1993, the district court 
                     
1
.   18 U.S.C. § 875(b) provides: 
 
  Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, 
firm, association, or corporation, any money or 
other thing of value, transmits in interstate 
commerce any communication containing any threat 
to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the 
person of another, shall be fined not more than 
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, 
or both. 
2
.   18 U.S.C. § 875(c) provides: 
 
  Whoever transmits in interstate commerce and 
communication containing any threat to kidnap any 
person or any threat to injure the person of 
another, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or 
imprisoned for more than five years, or both. 
  
denied the motion, finding that the firearms evidence was 
admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of Himelwright's intent to 
commit the crimes charged or, in the alternative, as indicative 
of his plan or preparation.  Memorandum Opinion at 5.  
Himelwright was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 18 months 
imprisonment,3 to be followed by three years supervised release.  
Himelwright appeals. 
 I. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because we believe that the district court 
erred in admitting testimony concerning Himelwright's purchase 
and possession of firearms, as well as the firearms themselves, 
we will reverse the district court's denial of the in limine 
motion and vacate Himelwright's conviction. 
  II. 
 Prior to his arrest on September 8, 1993, Himelwright 
had been employed as a truck driver with the United States Post 
Office in York, Pennsylvania.  Several months before the events 
which lead to his arrest occurred, Himelwright had been found 
guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol, a conviction 
which, because of the mandatory one-year suspension of driving 
privileges, jeopardized his continued employment as a truck 
                     
3
.   The 18 month sentence was imposed after the district court 
downwardly departed from the 37-46 month guideline range.  The 
downward departure was based on the fact that Himelwright "made 
threatening phone calls to an answering machine, not an actual 
person, and the answering machine was for a[] . . . hotline 
designed to assist employees."  United States v. Himelwright, No. 
93-222-01 (M.D. Pa. March 30, 1994)(order of judgment). 
  
driver.  In anticipation of having his license suspended, 
Himelwright applied for several non-driving jobs with the Postal 
Service.  Because he had two daughters who lived with their 
mother in Moorhead City, North Carolina, Himelwright focussed his 
efforts on openings in the Mid-Carolina's District. 
 One of the positions Himelwright sought was in 
Florence, South Carolina.4  The Florence postal facility had a 
maintenance position which would be held open until July 1, 1993.  
In order to qualify for the position, Himelwright was required to 
take and pass an aptitude test.  In early June, Himelwright was 
advised that the test was only conducted twice a year, in 
February and August.  He contacted the Postal Service's Employee 
Assistance Program (EAP) Hotline, and requested help in obtaining 
an earlier test date.  A test was scheduled for July 9, 1993, at 
the post office in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.  Either because he 
was approximately two hours late, or because the Postal Service 
did not accurately inform him of the time for the test, 
Himelwright was not able to take the test on July 9.  The test 
was then rescheduled for July 12, 1993, and Himelwright completed 
the exam that day.  When he was finally notified on July 24 that 
he had passed the test, however, the Florence position apparently 
was no longer an option.   
 Almost one week later, on the evening of August 30, 
1993, Himelwright placed several telephone calls to two Postal 
                     
4
.   Himelwright also applied for custodial position in Raleigh, 
North Carolina, where his transfer reassignment form was received 
on August 30, 1993.  
  
Service hotlines in Washington, D.C., from his home in York.  He 
had been drinking and was fearful that a hurricane was going to 
hit the town where his two daughters lived.  The first call, 
placed at approximately 8:20 p.m., was to the EAP Hotline.  
Because it was received after business hours, his call was 
answered by an answering machine.  Himelwright made the following 
statement: 
 Hello, my name is Richard C. Himelwright, 866 
Tioga Street, York, PA.  Case No. 1610.  I 
requested y'all to give me a letter from 
Lancaster where they stated they were going 
to give me the test by July 1st.  Y'all won't 
respond to that.  That's fine and dandy.  Now 
this is August 30th, 8:20 p.m., the hurricane 
is gonna hit in the next four hours, where my 
daughters live in Moorhead City, North 
Carolina, and y'all ain't doing shit about 
getting my transfer.  Now I'm very, very, 
irate here, this ain't a threat, but I shot 
on too many rifle teams, and I'm tired of 
being jerked around.  Now you all ain't 
giving me no help at all, none whatsoever.  
You won't return no phone call all of a 
sudden, nobody's doing nothing.  You told me 
that Lancaster said, "Oh yeah, you gonna have 
the test by July 1st."  Wrong.  I didn't get 
it until July 9th and then it was postponed 
'til July 12th.  Oh, that's not your fault, 
that's my fault, right?  Wrong.  I lost that 
transfer to Florence.  Now I'm trying for 
Raleigh, North Carolina.  Now I'm tellin' 
y'all right now, if I don't get that 
transfer, there's gonna be some shit!  Cause 
I'm tired of playing games with y'all.  I'm 
tired of playin', I don't even know if my 
daughters is gonna make it through the night.  
I can't even get through.  The lines are 
dead.  I don't even know where my daughters 
are right now.  They live in Moorhead City, 
North Carolina, where the storm is supposed 
to hit between now and midnight, and y'all 
ain't done shit for me.  You got me so (sob) 
freakin' upset.  Oh, never mind, you ain't no 
help. 
  
 Himelwright then called the Postal Inspection Service 
Crimes Hotline and left a message for a duty officer to return 
his call.  At about 8:30 p.m., Postal Service Police Officer 
Roberto S. Lloyd contacted Himelwright, who explained his 
predicament and, in the process, stated: 
 I am irate and upset because I'm getting 
shafted.  Someone better do something now 
because I'm getting tired of it now. . . .  I 
want to be with my daughters but the Postal 
Service is saying, "Fuck You!" . . .  If 
something happens to these children, someone 
is going down the tubes. . . .  I was a 
policeman in North Carolina and a weapons 
specialist in the Marine Corps.  Why is 
everybody messing with me?  They worry about 
shootings in the Post Office, they should 
worry about me if anything happens to my 
children because of the hurricane.  Shit will 
hit the fan; this is not a threat but a 
promise. 
 About one-half hour later, Himelwright called the EAP 
Hotline again and left another lengthy message.  He once again 
made threatening remarks and expressed his frustration about the 
Florence position as well as his concern that his children might 
be in danger.  He then called his friend and Local Union 
President, Henry P. Dennis, Jr.  Himelwright told Dennis: 
 Henry, I really blew it this time.  I really 
blew it big time.  My job's down the tubes.  
I just called the Postal Inspectors and 
spilled my guts.  I told them everything from 
Bill Runkel to them screwing around with my 
transfer to North Carolina.  I feel like 
coming in there and blowing everybody away.  
You don't have to worry, I don't want you. 
  
Dennis called the York Post Office receptionist and warned her 
that if Himelwright were to appear at the Post Office, she should 
call 911. 
 The next day, a group of Postal Inspectors gathered at 
the York Post Office.  They contacted Himelwright and asked him 
to come into the Post Office to be questioned.  Himelwright 
refused.  Later that day, the inspectors went to his home 
accompanied by a uniformed police officer.  After he executed a 
written waiver of his Miranda rights, the inspectors asked 
Himelwright whether he owned any firearms.  He produced two 
weapons -- a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver and a 
Thompson-Center Contender pistol.  The inspectors confiscated the 
weapons and asked Himelwright if he had placed any calls to the 
EAP and Crimes hotlines the night before.  Himelwright admitted 
placing the calls, but denied making any threats.  He also told 
the inspectors that he had made the calls after consuming alcohol 
and taking the drug diazepam.  His arrest and indictment on the 
charges mentioned above followed. 
 III. 
 When deciding whether to admit "other acts" evidence 
under Rule 404(b), a trial court initially must consider two 
issues:  first, whether the evidence is logically relevant, under 
Rules 404(b) and Rule 402, to any issue other than the 
defendant's propensity to commit the crime; and second, whether 
under Rule 403 the probative value of the evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect.  United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 
(3d Cir. 1992).  The trial court has significant leeway in making 
  
both determinations.  Id. at 886.  We, therefore, would 
ordinarily review the district court's evidentiary rulings for an 
abuse of discretion.  Id.  Where, however, the district court 
fails to explain its grounds for denying a Rule 403 objection and 
its reasons for doing so are not otherwise apparent from the 
record, there is no way to review its discretion.  Id. at 889 
(citing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 
918 (3d Cir. 1992)).  In such cases, we need not defer to the 
reasoning of the district court, and we may undertake to examine 
the record and perform the required balancing ourselves.  
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 186 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: 
 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
 Despite our characterization of Rule 404(b) as a rule 
of admissibility, United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019 
(3d Cir. 1988), we have expressed our concern that, although the 
proponents of Rule 404(b) evidence "will hardly admit it, the 
reasons proffered to admit prior act evidence may often be 
potemkin village, because the motive, we suspect, is often mixed 
between an urge to show some other consequential fact as well as 
to impugn the defendant's character."  United States v. Jemal, 26 
F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Sampson, 980 F.2d at 
  
886).  Thus, when evidence of prior bad acts is offered, the 
proponent must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a 
chain of logical inferences, no link of which can be the 
inference that the defendant has the propensity to commit the 
crime charged.  Jemal, 26 F.3d at 1272.  But even where the 
proffered evidence tends to prove some fact besides character, 
admissibility depends upon whether its probative value outweighs 
its prejudicial effect.5  As a result, once the proponent 
articulates a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b), the district 
court must weigh the probative value of the evidence against its 
potential to cause undue prejudice.  Id. at 1272. 
 With these familiar principles of admissibility and 
review in mind, we turn our attention to the district court's 
denial of Himelwright's motion in limine and the introduction of 
Himelwright's possession and purchase of the firearms in 
question. 
 IV. 
 The district court found that Himelwright's purchase 
and possession of firearms clearly constituted "other acts," 
whose admissibility is governed by Rule 404(b). Memorandum 
Opinion at 3.  The government offered two theories of 
                     
5
.   Fed.R.Evid. 403 provides: 
 
  Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
  
admissibility:  first, to rebut any claim by Himelwright that he 
lacked the requisite mens rea; and second, to show that 
Himelwright not only planned to carry out his threats, but that 
he was prepared to do so.  We will address these two theories in 
turn. 
 A. 
 In order to admit evidence under the "intent" component 
of Rule 404(b), intent must be an element of the crime charged 
and the evidence offered must cast light upon the defendant's 
intent to commit the crime.  United States v. Kirk, 528 F.2d 
1057, 1060 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 1. 
 In Count III of the indictment, Himelwright was charged 
with transmitting a wire communication with the intent to injure 
another, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).  The district court 
correctly determined that to establish a violation of this 
section, the government bore only the burden of proving that 
Himelwright acted knowingly and willfully when he placed the 
threatening telephone calls and that those calls were reasonably 
perceived as threatening bodily injury.  The government bore no 
burden of proving that Himelwright intended his calls to be 
threatening or that he had an ability at the time to carry out 
the threats.  United States v. Cox, 957 F.2d 264, 266 (6th Cir. 
1992); United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148-49 (6th Cir. 
1992); Cf. United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 
n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 115, governing threats 
made to federal law enforcement officer).  Himelwright's 
  
possession of the two firearms the morning after placing the 
calls, the government argued, could permissibly lead the jury not 
only to conclude that he possessed the guns at the time he placed 
the calls, but that his possession was evidence of his knowledge 
and willfulness. 
 On its face, this might appear to be a plausible basis 
for admissibility under Rule 404(b), at least to the extent that 
the government attempted to connect one of the exceptions 
delineated in the Rule (intent) to an element of the offense with 
which Himelwright was charged.  To appreciate the error in this 
position, however, and in the district court's acceptance of it, 
one must look deeper, for the problem with the government's 
argument lies in the unavoidable distinction between the general 
intent to make a threat to injure another, on the one hand, and a 
subjective intention to carry out the threats, on the other.  We 
believe the government's true aim in offering the firearms 
evidence was to prove the latter.  Significantly, section 875(c) 
requires proof of a defendant's general intent to threaten 
injury, but does not require proof of a specific intent to injure 
another or the present ability to carry out the threat.  United 
States v. Holder, 302 F. Supp. 296, 300 (D. Montana 1969), aff'd 
by, 427 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1970).  Cf. United States v. Cooper, 
523 F.2d 8, 10 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 875(b)).  
The government, however, offered no evidence showing a connection 
between Himelwright's possession of the firearms and his "intent" 
to place the telephone calls and say the things he did.  
Moreover, we cannot agree that Himelwright's possession of the 
  
firearms constituted evidence of his intent because the 
government did not need to establish that Himelwright had the 
specific intent to injure or the present ability to carry out the 
threats in order to establish a violation of section 875(c).  
Himelwright's intention to accomplish these things, which the 
government sought to establish through his possession of the 
firearms, simply was not an element of the crime charged and did 
not cast light upon his intention to commit the crime charged. 
 At best, the fact that Himelwright was found in 
possession of the firearms the day after he placed the calls is 
indicative of his capability to carry out the threats.  Evidence 
of capability, however, is not only unnecessary to satisfy the 
elements of section 875(c); it is likewise not included among the 
categories of admissibility to which Rule 404(b) is addressed.  
Although evidence can be admitted even if it does not fit one of 
the specific exceptions listed in the Rule, character evidence 
which is offered to prove the likelihood that the defendant 
committed the particular crime is nevertheless inadmissible.  
Jemal, 26 F.3d at 1272 (citing Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1019).  Here, 
the government sought to convince the jury that Himelwright's 
capability to carry out the threats or to injure, demonstrated 
through his possession of the firearms, made it more likely that 
he intended to do so.  Thus, while the government's argument was 
cloaked in terms of Himelwright's intent, the goal here was 
actually something different; it was to portray Himelwright as a 
person who possessed the wherewithal to do what he said he would 
do in order to demonstrate that it was more than likely that he 
  
intended the threats and had, therefore, committed the crime 
charged. 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the forbidden purpose 
which lay barely beneath the surface of the government's argument 
-- the likelihood that Himelwright committed the offense based on 
an inference of his intent drawn from evidence pertaining to his 
character (his possession of two firearms) -- renders the 
evidence inadmissible under Rule 404(b).  Id.  See also 
Archibald, 987 F.2d at 185; cf. Huddleston v. United States, 485 
U.S. 681, 691 (1988).  In so concluding, we emphasize the 
important distinction between the use of character evidence to 
show Himelwright's intention to make the threatening calls, as 
charged under section 875(c), which might have been permissible 
under Rule 404(b) had the government connected it to his 
possession of the firearms, and the use of such evidence to show 
that he had the capability to act upon the threats.  The latter 
may easily be seen as a disguised attempt to accomplish precisely 
what is disallowed, namely, to show that "more than likely" the 
defendant intended to do that with which he or she stands 
charged. 
 2. 
 We reach a different conclusion -- applying a somewhat 
different rationale -- with respect to Counts I and II (the 18 
U.S.C. § 875(b) counts).  Under § 875(b), the government was not 
only required to prove that Himelwright knowingly and willfully 
made the calls, but that he acted with the specific intent to 
extort a thing of value from the Postal Service.  The government 
  
argued that evidence of Himelwright's possession of the two 
handguns entitled the jury to conclude that he acted with the 
specific intent to extort a job transfer when he communicated the 
threats. 
 We agree that a plausible argument could be made that 
the fact that Himelwright was capable of carrying out the threats 
might be relevant to his intent to extort a job transfer; that 
is, we do not discount the contention that one's capacity to do 
violence to another could bear some relevance to one's intent in 
conveying an extortionate threat.  Conceivably, despite the fact 
that the recipients of the calls were hundreds of miles away, the 
jury could have (1) inferred from the presence of the two 
handguns in his house that Himelwright was more likely to have 
had the capacity to carry out a threat of violence than if he had 
no handguns in his house,6 (2) inferred from the fact that he may 
have had the capacity to carry out a threat of violence that 
Himelwright was more likely to have wished to make a threat of 
violence than if he had no such capacity, and (3) inferred from 
the fact that he may have had a wish to make a threat of violence 
that Himelwright was more likely to have understood his 
communication to be a threat of violence. 
                     
6
.   The jury may have regarded this link in the chain of logic 
as being foreclosed by the judge's instructions.  While he told 
the jury that it could consider whether the presence of the 
handguns was "probative as to whether defendant intended to make 
threats," he also instructed that the presence of the handguns 
"may not be used to conclude that the defendant had the ability 
to carry out his alleged threat."  We have been unable to 
perceive any chain of logic from the presence of the handguns to 
the required intent that does not involve this apparently 
prohibited link. 
  
 But even assuming arguendo that Himelwright's gun 
possession is marginally relevant to the specific intent to 
extort, we nevertheless find that the probative value of the 
firearms evidence was substantially outweighed by the resulting 
prejudice to Himelwright.  In Part V, below, we set forth a full 
and detailed analysis with respect to the Rule 403 violation, as 
well as our views concerning the district court's failure to 
conduct the requisite balancing of interests under the Rule.  For 
present purposes, however, because we conclude that the evidence 
should have been excluded by Rule 403, we will assume, without 
deciding, that Himelwright's possession of the firearms was 
relevant to his intent to extort and, therefore, admissible under 
Rule 404(b). 
 B.    
 In addition to arguing that the firearms evidence was 
admissible as proof of intent, the government contended that the 
firearms evidence was admissible under the "plan" and 
"preparation" exceptions to Rule 404(b).  It argued that 
Himelwright's purchase of the Smith and Wesson revolver on or 
about June 20, 1993, less than one week after he made the first 
call to the EAP Hotline to inquire about getting an earlier test 
date, tended to establish a pre-conceived plan to threaten 
violence in the event that the Postal Service did not meet his 
transfer demands.  But this argument fails to acknowledge that at 
the time Himelwright initiated the purchase of the revolver, he 
had no way of knowing that he would experience difficulty in 
securing a transfer.  This is a significant missing "link" in the 
  
chain of logical inferences which the government must clearly 
articulate as the very foundation for admissibility of prior bad 
act evidence, rendering the links which remain inherently and 
inevitably flawed.  To carry the metaphor further, it is 
important to note again that no link in the chain may contain an 
inference that because the defendant committed the prior act, it 
is, therefore, more likely that he or she committed this one, 
too.  Jemal, 26 F.3d at 1272 (citing Sampson, 980 F.2d at 887).  
But that is precisely what we are left with here, for as we 
discuss below, we can find no demonstrable link -- not even a 
remote one -- between, on the one hand, the purchase of the 
revolver in June (at a time when Himelwright was just beginning 
to pursue a transfer), and his "planning" or "preparing" to carry 
out threats of violence because he was, over a month later, 
unsuccessful in obtaining the transfer. 
 We believe the relevant time frame with respect to a 
plan or preparation is the time between the purchase of the 
revolver on or about June 20, 1993, and the August 30 telephone 
calls.7  The government did not present any evidence of 
                     
7
.   See United States v. Philibert, 947 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 
1991).  In reviewing a district court's admission of evidence 
concerning Philibert's purchases of weapons and ammunition two 
months prior to making threatening telephone calls to his 
supervisor, the Eleventh Circuit stated: 
 
  . . . we fail to perceive, any possible relevance, 
on the question of whether appellant did or did 
not place a threatening phone call . . . on 
August 11, 1989, of the fact that two months 
earlier he had purchased certain firearms. 
 
Philibert, 947 F.2d at 1470. 
  
Himelwright's actions during this time period which could be 
construed as part of a plan or scheme to threaten anyone, let 
alone to extort a transfer from the Postal Service.  Nor did the 
government offer any evidence connecting the purchase of the 
weapon in June to the threats Himelwright issued at the end of 
August.  Indeed, a fair reading of the transcripts suggests that 
the impetus for the calls was a hurricane which Himelwright 
perceived as a threat to the safety of his children in North 
Carolina, and his perception that by failing to transfer him, the 
Postal Service was responsible for his inability to respond to an 
imminent danger to his children.  While we in no way mean to 
imply that this constituted any justification for Himelwright's 
actions, that is the thrust of his profanity-laced, threatening 
diatribes.  The transcripts may also fairly be read to evince an 
intent on the part of Himelwright to retaliate through the use of 
firearms.  The meaning to be ascribed to the transcripts, 
however, in light of the other evidence in this case, is for a 
jury to determine if this case is to be retried.  But the point 
here is that there is no evidence to suggest that the threats 
flowed from a plan Himelwright had concocted in June -- again, 
before he even knew whether he would be transferred -- when he 
purchased the revolver.  While such a conjectural leap might 
support the government's theory, the two events are far too 
attenuated and devoid of evidence of any connection to one 
another to fall within the ambit of Rule 404(b). 
(..continued) 
  
  
   V. 
 Even if we were to accept that the government's 
proffered purposes were somehow proper under Rule 404(b), our 
inquiry would not end there because the trial court failed to 
determine and to articulate whether the probative value of the 
firearms evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect under Rule 
403.  Sampson, 980 F.2d at 889 (citing United States v. 
Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 1988)).  Once again, when a 
court engages in a Rule 403 balancing and articulates on the 
record a rational explanation for its determination, we will 
rarely disturb its ruling.  Id. at 889 (citing Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 420 (3d Cir. 1991)).  
Where, as here, the court fails to perform this analysis, the 
measure of deference we might otherwise accord is lessened, and 
we may undertake to examine the record ourselves and conduct the 
appropriate weighing test.  Archibald, 987 F.2d at 186. 
 Our review of the record compels us to conclude that 
even if the firearms evidence had been admissible under Rule 
404(b), a proper balancing of its probative value against its 
prejudicial effect under Rule 403 would have rendered it 
inadmissible in any event. 
 Initially, it is impossible to overlook the powerful 
impact of this type of evidence on the questions whether the 
telephone calls were, indeed, sufficiently threatening to satisfy 
the elements of section 875(c) beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
whether Himelwright made them with the intent to extort a job 
transfer from the Postal Service, in violation of section 875(b).  
  
The words Himelwright uttered to the answering machines; the 
statements he made to Dennis; the statements he made to Officer 
Lloyd; the statements he made to the Postal Inspectors; and the 
circumstances surrounding his failed attempt to secure a transfer 
all speak for themselves.  Without question, a rational chain of 
inferences could be drawn from these evidentiary links, each of 
which bore some logical relevance to the criminal charges 
Himelwright faced.  But to compound that evidence by asking the 
jury to draw inferences as to Himelwright's intent from his 
purchase and possession of the two firearms was, we think, to 
invite a degree of prejudice which outweighed the probative value 
of that evidence under a proper balancing pursuant to Rule 403. 
 The government dwelled upon the guns at great length 
when presenting its evidence and making its closing argument.  At 
trial, the man who sold Himelwright the revolver on June 22 was 
called by the government to testify about the transaction.  He 
indicated that Himelwright was "very nervous" and that his hand 
was "shaking" when he bought the gun.  Appellant's App. 64a.  The 
government also tendered testimony from the man who helped 
complete the paperwork associated with the sale of the revolver.  
He testified that Himelwright did not take possession of the 
revolver until approximately July 1, when all background checks 
had been completed.  Then, the government called one of the 
postal inspectors who visited Himelwright the day after the 
telephone calls and solicited testimony that the two handguns 
were in Himelwright's home at the time of his visit.  The 
government concluded its closing argument to the jury with the 
  
following comments, which contained all of its argument 
concerning the handguns: 
  We know, ladies and gentlemen, that less 
than a week [after telephoning the EAP 
Hotline for assistance in arranging a 
custodial worker's examination], Mr. 
Himelwright bought a gun.  He bought a .38 
caliber revolver.  He bought it from William 
Kiehl. 
 
  Mr. Kiehl testified and the firearms 
dealer that was involved in the transfer, 
Greg Flinchbaugh, testified.  They told about 
how Mr. Himelwright inspected the gun and 
bought it that night for $120.00 cash.  He 
told you how the paperwork was filled out so 
that Mr. Himelwright could get legal 
ownership of that gun.  But for some reason, 
Mr. Himelwright never personally appeared 
before Mr. Flinchbaugh. 
 
  The question has been raised why a .38 
caliber revolver?  Several explanations have 
been offered.  One, Mr. Himelwright wanted to 
use it for target practice.  Two, he was a 
gun collector.  Three, he wanted to give the 
gun as a gift to Bonnie, his girlfriend. 
 
  But you heard the testimony.  Is a short 
barrel, a two and a half inch barrel .38 
caliber revolver a gun that is normally used 
for target shooting?  No, it is too 
inaccurate.  It is not a gun used by target 
shooters. 
 
  A gun collector?  Mr. Himelwright wasn't 
a gun collector.  He had two guns, but he 
wasn't a gun collector. 
 
  And giving it as a gift to Bonnie Irvin 
[his girlfriend]?  You heard her testimony.  
Bonnie Irvin never shot that gun.  In fact, 
she told you she never even held it. 
 
  Why a .38 caliber?  We know Mr. 
Himelwright was a police officer for six 
years in North Carolina.  Thirty-eight 
caliber revolvers are handguns that are 
  
normally used by police departments.  As Mr. 
Himelwright repeatedly told you, he was a 
weapons specialist.  He was a cop.  He knew 
about guns.  He knew how to handle them.  He 
went out and bought a .38 caliber revolver.  
That gun wasn't for anybody else except for 
Richard Himelwright's use. 
 
Appellant's App. 99a-100a. 
 The object, or at least effect, of this 
disproportionate emphasis by the prosecution, we believe, was to 
portray Himelwright as a violence-prone postal worker who was a 
danger to society and who needed to be removed for the protection 
of the public.8 
 Moreover, the manner in which this evidence was used at 
trial exacerbated the error of its admission:  the prosecutor was 
permitted to introduce into evidence, and display before the 
                     
8
.   Himelwright's two-day trial took place on November 15 and 
16, 1993, following a series of well publicized shooting sprees 
by postal workers.  See, e.g., Workers Kill Workers; Yet Again, 
Violence in the Post Office, New York Times, May 9, 1993, Sec. 4, 
at 2; Inside Post Offices, the Mail is Only Part of the Pressure, 
New York Times, May 15, 1993, at A1; Postal Study Aims to Spot 
Violence-Prone Workers, New York Times, July 1, 1993, at A9.  As 
reported in the New York Times on August 3, 1993, "There have 
been at least 11 shooting incidents involving aggrieved 
emotionally disturbed postal workers in the United States in the 
last decade with 35 people killed and 18 wounded."  Police Arrest 
Postal Worker in Pistol Threat to His Wife, New York Times, 
Aug. 3, 1993, at B5. 
 
 We believe the government's portrait of Himelwright as the 
stereotypical violence-prone postal worker had serious potential 
for prejudice to him in two different ways.  First, it had the 
potential for frightening the jury into ignoring evidence that 
otherwise might have raised a reasonable doubt about whether he 
intended a serious threat.  Second, if the jury was persuaded 
that Himelwright was violence-prone by character, it might have 
inferred that he intended violence in this particular instance.  
That inference is precisely what Rule 404(b) prohibits. 
  
jury, the firearms themselves.  Such a method of introduction is 
not proscribed.  But because of the remote connection between the 
possession (or purchase) of the firearms and telephone calls, the 
display of weaponry was far more prejudicial than probative under 
the circumstances of this case.  We believe that this enabled, if 
not invited, the jury to draw impermissible inferences which 
might well have deprived Himelwright of a fair trial.9 
 VI. 
  For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that 
evidence of Himelwright's purchase and possession of firearms 
should not have been admitted under Rule 404(b) as evidence of a 
                     
9
.   We note that the district court gave the following 
precautionary instruction: 
 
  Ladies and gentlemen, the mere fact that the 
defendant had purchased or possessed firearms may 
not be used to conclude that the defendant had the 
ability to carry out his alleged threat.  You will 
recall I said that is not an element of the 
offense. 
 
  Nor may you conclude from the fact of the purchase 
or possession that the recipient of the 
defendant's statements took them as threats.  You 
may consider whether these facts are probative as 
to whether defendant intended to make threats. 
 
Government's App. 45-46. 
 
 Although this instruction reflect's the district court's 
apparent understanding of the potential for undue prejudice to 
Himelwright, it does not cure the error in the first instance in 
not conducting the balancing of interests which Rule 403 
requires, and which should have lead to the exclusion of 
Himelwright's possession and purchase of the firearms. United 
States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 886, 889 (3d Cir. 1992) (Rule 403 
requires the district court to evaluate evidence in the context 
of the developing case). 
  
plan or preparation to commit the crimes charged, or of 
Himelwright's intent with respect to section 875(c).  Assuming, 
as we do, that Himelwright's gun possession was marginally 
relevant to his intent to extort, we nevertheless conclude that 
the admission of the firearms evidence violated Rule 403.  We 
further find that the district court erred by not performing the 
balancing analysis in response to the Rule 403 objection.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's denial of 
Himelwright's motion in limine, vacate Himelwright's conviction 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
